| THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS |
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• When did the Soviet Union become so interested in Cuba? • Who bears responsibility for the failed Bay of Pigs invasion? • What was "Operation Mongoose"? • Why did Fidel Castro appeal to the Soviet Union for military aid? • What was the Soviet justification for moving missiles into Cuba? • How truly serious was the Cuban Missile Crisis? • What was Adlai Stevenson's famous reply to the Soviet ambassador? • How did President John F. Kennedy compel the Russians to withdraw from Cuba? • How have scholars evaluated the President's actions in the crisis? • Why is the United States allowed to keep Guantanamo Bay Naval Base on Cuban soil? • How historically accurate is the movie Thirteen Days? • Who was Kenneth O'Donnell? |
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In 1959, the Soviet Union found an unexpected opportunity to expand its communist influence into America's backyard. Revolutionary forces in Cuba led by Fidel Castro overthrew the corrupt dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, a long-time ally of the United States. President Dwight D. Eisenhower promptly recognized the new government, but Castro's anti-Americanism soon became evident as he established close ties with the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the President directed the Central Intelligence Agency to develop plans to oust the troublesome Castro. Just prior to leaving office, Eisenhower broke diplomatic relations with Castro and advised President-elect John F. Kennedy to carry forth the CIA's planned invasion of Cuba. Thus, enormous pressure was immediately thrust upon the new President. Although somewhat uneasy over the scheme tossed in his lap by the former administration, Kennedy nonetheless viewed the potential military victory over Castro preferable to attempted negotiation and possible compromise. In addition, one of the top priorities of the Kennedy administration was military expansion to enable America to carry on Cold War negotiations from a position of strength. Success against Castro would surely support this concept. In April of 1961, some 1,400 anti-Castro Cuban exiles, specially trained in Central America by the CIA, assaulted Cuba's southern coast at the Bay of Pigs. When the local citizens failed to buttress the rebel forces, as hoped, and the United States refused to send air support, as promised, the invasion was repulsed. The CIA had completely botched the mission. (Four American fliers, members of the Alabama Air National Guard, were killed in the ill-fated maneuver.) World opinion sharply criticized United States aggression toward an apparent weaker Latin American neighbor. The Bay of Pigs disaster left Kennedy feeling as though America had lost face with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the incident was a source of personal embarrassment for the President. After meeting in Vienna, Austria, with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev shortly after the invasion, Kennedy told a New York Times reporter, "[Khrushchev] thinks because of the Bay of Pigs that I'm inexperienced. Probably thinks I'm stupid. Maybe most important, he thinks that I have no guts." A Viennese joke went like this: "Khrushchev says, 'Give me your watch and wallet.' Kennedy says, 'No.' Khrushchev then says, 'Be reasonable. Let's negotiate. Just give me your wallet.'" Hence, Kennedy's resolve to foil Castro was sufficiently fueled. The President authorized his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, to instruct the CIA in massive harassment of Cuba. Under "Operation Mongoose," the United States government covertly attempted to disrupt Cuba's trade, supported raids on Cuba, and plotted with organized crime bosses to assassinate Castro. In addition, the United States orchestrated Cuba's eviction from the Organization of American States. Seeking relief from the relentless American hostility, Castro requested military assistance from the Soviet Union. The Soviets, anxious to firmly entrench communism in a country less than 100 miles from the United States, enthusiastically complied. The Soviet Union recklessly proceeded to install guided missiles in Cuba with the capacity to deliver hydrogen warheads to both North and South America. In mid-October of 1962, the clandestine missile sites were photographed by an American U-2 spy plane. The photos were presented to Kennedy on Tuesday morning, October 16, whereupon he immediately created an Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Ex Comm) to handle the situation. Several alternatives were proposed. Some Ex Comm members favored an immediate air strike, perhaps followed by a full-scale military invasion. Other Committee people suggested negotiation with Castro. Another option was to submit the entire matter to the United Nations. Finally, on the advice of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Kennedy ordered a naval blockade—a "quarantine" of Cuba—to prevent any further arms build-up. The decision represented a compromise between all-out armed warfare and doing nothing. From that point, either further escalation or withdrawal were possible courses of action, depending on the Soviet response to the blockade. While 56 American warships moved south to form the blockade, additional military preparations were underway. Some 60 B-52s, armed with almost 200 hydrogen bombs, were airborne at all times (the pilots carried sealed envelopes specifying their targets), and 628 more bombers, loaded with over 2,000 nuclear weapons, were dispersed to airfields around the globe. A dozen Polaris submarines carrying 144 nuclear missiles were dispatched toward the coast of Russia. America's Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (located on Cuban soil) was reinforced. Further, "Operation Scabbards," the top-secret invasion of Cuba with 90,000 troops, was scheduled for October 30. In a brief televised address on the evening of October 22, the President informed anxious American citizens that the Soviet Union was preparing offensive missile sites in Cuba. Kennedy publicly called on Khrushchev to "halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace." Khrushchev balked, citing the placement of American missiles and troops in Turkey, which neighbored the USSR, as justification for the parallel Soviet action in Cuba. (Actually, the Jupiter missiles in Turkey were practically obsolete, but their mere presence nevertheless irked hard-line Soviet military leaders.) For several days the world teetered on the brink of nuclear disaster as the two military superpowers squared off. Kennedy and Khrushchev exchanged calculated correspondence, government advisors feverishly issued recommendations, military commanders readied their troops for nuclear war, and both heads-of-state searched their mind and soul for purpose to their next action. The enormous intensity of the entire situation was captured in the words of Secretary of State Dean Rusk. When a preliminary report reached the White House on October 24 indicating the Russian ships had stopped dead in the water (apparently because of the imposed blockade), Rusk confided to a network television newsman, "We're eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked." Perhaps the most memorable episode of the entire Cuban Missile Crisis occurred on the afternoon of October 25. It is the confrontation between Adlai Stevenson, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, and his Soviet counterpart, Valerian Zorin, at an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council. Unbeknownst to Zorin, Stevenson was armed with aerial photographs confirming the Russian missile installations in Cuba. Stevenson's verbal surgery on Zorin was masterful. Facing his adversary, Stevenson demanded, "All right, sir, let me ask you one simple question. Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the USSR has placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no? Don't wait for the translation; yes or no?" The indignant Zorin replied, "I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and therefore I do not wish to answer a question that is put to me in the fashion in which a prosecutor puts questions. In due course, sir, you will have your answer." Stevenson kept at Zorin: "You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer yes or no. You have denied that they exist, and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly." Again, the Soviet diplomat tried to put Stevenson off: "Continue with your statement. You will have your answer in due course." The came Stevenson's classic retort: "I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that's your decision. And I am also prepared to present the evidence in this room." With that, he revealed the incriminating photographs. The Soviet Union fell back on its heels! On October 27, several events accelerated the crisis. FBI agents learned that Soviet officials in New York City were burning documents. A U-2 plane was shot down over Cuba. Work on the missile sites was notably hastened. Another Khrushchev letter arrived in Washington with tougher demands than before. By nightfall, the prevailing tone was foreboding; war with Russia seemed imminent. The next day, after nearly two weeks of cat-and-mouse negotiations, during which the entire globe held its breath, Khrushchev finally agreed to abandon Cuba, whereupon Kennedy lifted the blockade and pledged to respect Cuban sovereignty. Privately, Robert Kennedy also promised removal of the American missiles from Turkey, but warned that if Moscow disclosed this secret deal, the President would deny it. The world breathed a collective sigh of relief—World War III had been avoided. Through persistence and forbearance, Kennedy scored an impressive Cold War victory over attempted communist expansion into the Western Hemisphere. In doing so, he managed to preserve world peace by averting an immediate threat of nuclear war, restore America's national honor in the wake of recent international humiliations, and silence many world critics of United States actions in the Cold War. Although some historians have charged that Kennedy's handling of the crisis courted disaster and that he could have dodged the situation altogether, it was nevertheless his finest hour as President. The discredited Khrushchev, on the other hand, was forced to resign two years later. As it turned out, it does not appear the Soviet missiles in Cuba (there were 42) were sufficient enough to substantially change the strategic balance of power—America would have maintained its existing clear nuclear superiority over Russia. Furthermore, the USSR certainly knew that to deploy its Cuban-based missiles would have been suicidal. Yet, to the rest of the world, the missiles gave the appearance of significant Soviet gains in nuclear strike capability, thereby altering the perceived balance of power. Kennedy reasoned the very placement of the missiles therefore diminished American credibility and presented a direct challenge to United States influence over Latin America. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy seemed more willing to avoid Cold War showdowns and to entertain ideas of arms control. The high drama of the Cuban Missile Crisis is recounted moment-by-moment, blow-by-blow in the movie Thirteen Days, released in 2000. It features Bruce Greenwood as President John F. Kennedy, Steven Culp as Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Dylan Baker as Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Michael Fairman as United States Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson. The film's central character is Special Assistant to the President Kenneth P. O'Donnell, played by Kevin Costner. Predictably, his role in defusing the Cuban Missile Crisis is overstated. The title of the film is copied from Robert Kennedy's 1967 book, a compilation of his personal recollections and diary entries about the event. The book does not, however, serve as the primary historical source for the movie. Instead, the filmscript is drawn from other books, as well as historical documents, Oval Office tapes, and interviews with O'Donnell conducted in the 1970s. As a result, Thirteen Days presents a generally accurate, but definitely Hollywood-enhanced account of the harrowing Cuban Missile Crisis. The movie's most apparent chief flaw is the inflated status of Costner/O'Donnell. O'Donnell and Robert Kennedy were close friends, dating back to 1947 when they crossed paths at Harvard University; both were football players and members of the debate team. During the 1950s, O'Donnell served as an election campaign operator for the Kennedys. His loyalty and skillfullness earned him a position within JFK's White House administration. Even though O'Donnell was apparently involved in some minor policy-making decisions from time to time, and despite the fact that he and Bobby Kennedy were the President's closest confidants, O'Donnell's actual part in the October Crisis was negligible. Indeed, the younger Kennedy mentions O'Donnell just three times in his entire book, none of which come at particularly significant junctures. The other major distortion in Thirteen Days is less specific, but more important overall. Dean Acheson, based on his experience as Secretary of State under President Harry S Truman, was summoned before Ex Comm meetings to provide insight concerning Khrushchev's Cold War philosophy and to offer conjecture about Russia's actions in the days ahead relative to its placement of missiles in Cuba. A hard-liner who openly favored American military retaliation against the Soviets, Acheson later privately evaluated Kennedy's success in the crisis as "plain dumb luck." Acheson's sour grapes comment might not have been too far off the mark. The perception of Kennedy as cool, calm, and collected is the result of overbaked American pride. In fact, the American government's handling of the affair was anything but deft; accidents, near misses, and misinformation almost created doomsday. The entire Cuban Missile Crisis has been often reduced to confrontation between Kennedy and Khrushchev, understood as a sort of potential modern-day gunfight at the O.K. Corral that was defused at the very last instant as both sides were about to draw their guns and blast away. This image of the crisis, so firmly planted in many Americans' minds, was unintentionally created by the now-infamous remark made by JFK's Secretary of State. Rusk's allegoric stare down between Kennedy, representing law and order and everything right, and the cold and calculating Khrushchev, out to conquer the world and impose communism throughout, ended when the Soviet leader lost his nerve. (Whereas according to Rusk, Khrushchev "blinked," the version offered later by a Soviet official recalled that Khrushchev had "shitted in his pants.") JFK's personal interpretation of what happened was understandably energetic; he told some close friends, "I cut his balls off." The President's exuberance was justified, to a certain extent. He survived the threat of nuclear war (whether genuine or perceived) and in the process, America swapped places with the Soviet Union as the Cold War's bad guy. Still, in order to necessitate peace, Kennedy was forced to abandon his preoccupation with overthrowing the Castro regime and to dismantle American missiles in Turkey. The Soviets, on the other hand, gave up nothing (notwithstanding some injury to their global credibility). The Soviet attempt to position missiles in Cuba similar in fashion to what the United States had already placed in Turkey was an act of Cold War reciprocity. In other words, the move indicates recognition of military weakness on the part of the Soviet Union rather than serious hemispheric aggression. Khrushchev was well aware that nuclear war would be suicidal; evidence simply does not support the idea that the Soviets were designing war against the United States in 1962. Hence, the true analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis reflects artful deal-making, not sheer American omnipotence. Thirteen Days is laced with bits of archival video, and quite a few pieces that have been made to appear like actual preserved footage. The rating is PG-13. There is intermittent strong language, but hardly more than what one typically hears today at restaurants or ballgames. The dramatic Ex Comm meetings are preserved on audio tapes. Upon taking office, Kennedy had instructed the Secret Service to install a taping system in meeting rooms and on telephones throughout the White House. Only a select few individuals had knowledge of the system. Hence, many of the President's colleagues, including his Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, were unaware their remarks were being recorded for posterity. Guantanamo Bay is America's oldest overseas naval base. Located on the very eastern tip of Cuba, Guantanamo is the only U.S. base built on Communist soil. Originally, it was a Caribbean vacation retreat owned by New York Journal publisher William Randolph Hearst. He allowed the Navy use of the area following the Havana harbor explosion of the USS Maine in February of 1898, which helped precipitate the Spanish-American War. As a result of the Platt Amendment of 1901, the United States leased this site from Cuba as a naval base. The treaty was renewed in 1934. Both governments must agree in order to revoke the arrangement. Every year since, the Treasury Department has sent a check for $4,085 to Havana. Fidel Castro, who calls Guantanamo a "dagger in the heart of the Cuban homeland," refuses to accept the payment. Two years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro cut the water supply to the base, forcing the Navy to import water and eventually build its own desalination plant. The 45-square mile Gitmo (as it is referred to in Navy parlance) is surrounded by almost 18 miles of fence, laced with concertina wire and equipped with sound and motion detectors. Dense brush and shark-infested waters also add to the security. Until the late 1990s, the American section of "no-man's land" (the area separating the base from Cuban territory) was heavily mined. Marines who patrolled the strip were required to have their Social Security numbers tatooed to their underarms to aid identification in case of an explosion. While most of the American mines have been removed, Cuba's remain planted. For the past half-century, Guantanamo has served primarily as a listening post, training center, and refueling station for the Atlantic Fleet. In 2002, the base was prepared as a makeshift POW camp ("Camp X-Ray") for al-Qaida and Taliban captives from the U.S. war on terrorism levied in Afghanistan. President Kennedy's reaction to Adlai Stevenson's televised duel with Valerian Zorin: "Terrific! I never knew Adlai had it in him. Too bad he didn't show some of this steam in the 1956 campaign." Stevenson had days earlier suggested to the Ex Comm that the United States offer to withdraw its missiles in Turkey and abandon Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, as well, in return for the Soviets removing their missiles from Cuba. His proposal was met with open displeasure, and he was viewed by several Ex Comm members as being too timid and conciliatory toward the Russians, even to the point of disgracing American honor. (Stevenson had been defeated by Eisenhower for the presidency in both 1952 and 1956.) Hence, the jubilant surprise in the President's remarks. The American U-2 plane shot down on October 27 was that of Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr., from South Carolina. He was one of the two pilots (along with Major Richard Heyser) who had conducted the original air reconnaissance which discovered the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. In a moment of frustration during the high point of the affair, President Kennedy lamented to his Secretary of Defense, "It is insane that two men, sitting on opposite sides of the world, should be able to decide to bring an end to civilization." With that thought in mind, a telephone "hot line" connecting Washington and Moscow, to be staffed around the clock by technicians and translators, was installed to provide instantaneous communication between the White House and the Kremlin in the event of a future Cold War crisis. Kenneth O'Donnell was devastated by the assassinations of President Kennedy (November 1963 in Dallas) and his brother Robert (June 1968 in Los Angeles). After two unsuccessful bids for governor of Massachusetts, O'Donnell became a depressed alcoholic, feeling guilt over the murders of the Kennedys—he determined the final motorcade route for JFK in Dallas and encouraged Senator Kennedy to run for the presidency in 1968. (The movie Thirteen Days seems to imply that O'Donnell's emotional stability was fractured by the extreme stress of Cuban Missile Crisis.) O'Donnell died a broken man in 1977 at the early age of 53. His daughter Helen has since written A Common Good: The Friendship of Robert Kennedy and Kenneth P. O'Donnell. Robert Kennedy once ordered the FBI to examine some wine, sent as a gift to the President from Premier Khrushchev, for poison or personality-altering drugs. The FBI lab reported, "No drugs or poisons were identified. The wine was consumed in the examination." |
